Drag the manipulator to change the size. Ziehen Sie den Manipulator, um die Größe zu ändern. This manipulator is a small green square. Dieser Manipulator hat die Form eines kleinen grünen Quadrats. This sensor system passes its measurement data to a processor which controls the manipulator. Dieses Sensorsystem gibt die gemessenen Daten an einen Rechner, der wiederum das Handhabungsgerät auch steuert. A manipulator intended for cooperation with an industrial robot. Handhabungsgerät, vorgesehen für das Zusammenwirken mit einem Industrieroboter. Once Distort or Warp is activated, tap-drag the manipulator to create the effect of foreshortening. Wenn die Option Verzerren oder Verziehen aktiviert ist, tippen/ziehen Sie den Manipulator, um den Effekt einer perspektivischen Verkürzungen zu erschaffen. Pneumoelastic manipulator for robotised harvesting of fruit (A.I.D. Pneumoelastischer Manipulator für die robotisierte Obsternste (A.I.D. Übersetzungen für manipulator im Englisch » Deutsch-Wörterbuch von PONS Online:manipulator, stock market manipulator. The Manipulator Songtext von Supersoul mit Lyrics, deutscher Übersetzung, Musik-Videos und Liedtexten kostenlos auf Songtexte.com. Definition, Rechtschreibung, Synonyme und Grammatik von 'Manipulator' auf Duden online nachschlagen. Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. By 1993, with the C.I.A.’s support, Chalabi had solidified his role as the leader of the Iraqi National Congress. Before long, however, financial questions arose. A former I.N.C. Associate said, “The agency didn’t know how he spent his money. All transactions were cash.” Kurds who had joined the I.N.C. Complained that Chalabi wouldn’t tell them anything about the group’s finances. A Kurdish leader said that Chalabi “snapped” when asked about debts that were still owed to Kurds, and argued that he couldn’t disclose funding details because his financing was “covert.” A former C.I.A. Officer said that successive audits identified no wrongdoing. But the I.N.C.’s finances weren’t easy to inspect. At one point, he said, I.N.C. Officials “refused to coöperate with an audit because they argued that it would breach the secrecy of the operation.” On one occasion, a team of government auditors was spirited into the offices of the I.N.C. “It was a real headache,” he recalled. The auditors found that the books were in order, but that many expenditures were wasteful. Some observers of the I.N.C. Wondered what return the U.S. Government was getting for its multimillion-dollar investment. In 1994 and 1995, Robert Baer, the former C.I.A. Officer, met Chalabi several times in Kurdistan, in northern Iraq, an autonomous area protected from Saddam by the United States. Chalabi had established an outpost in Kurdistan. “He was like the American Ambassador to Iraq,” Baer recalled. “He could get to the White House and the C.I.A. He would move around Iraq with five or six Land Cruisers.” But Baer added that Chalabi’s long absence from Iraq diminished his power there, and his ineffectiveness made him a useful foil for Saddam. “If he was dangerous, they could have killed him at any time. He was the perfect opposition leader,” he said. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were flowing each month “to this shadowy operator—in cars, salaries—and it was just a Potemkin village,” Baer said. “He was reporting no intel; it was total trash. The I.N.C.’s intelligence was so bad, we weren’t even sending it in.” Chalabi’s agenda, he said, was to convince the United States that Saddam’s regime was “a leaking warehouse of gas, and all we had to do was light a match.” But when the agency tried to check Chalabi’s assertions about troop movement or palace plans, Baer said, “there was no detail, no sourcing—you couldn’t see it on a satellite.” In retrospect, one detail of Chalabi’s operation seems particularly noteworthy. In 1994, Baer said, he went with Chalabi to visit “a forgery shop” that the I.N.C. Had set up inside an abandoned schoolhouse in Salahuddin, a town in Kurdistan. “It was something like a spy novel,” Baer said. “It was a room where people were scanning Iraqi intelligence documents into computers, and doing disinformation. There was a whole wing of it that he did forgeries in.” Baer had no evidence that Chalabi forged any of the disputed intelligence documents that were used to foment alarm in the run-up to the war. But, he said, “he was forging back then, in order to bring down Saddam.” In the Los Angeles Times, Hugh Pope wrote of one harmless-seeming prank that emerged from Chalabi’s specialty shop: a precise mockup of an Iraqi newspaper that was filled with stories about Saddam’s human-rights abuses. Another faked document ended up directly affecting Baer.
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